India needs ‘NonAlignment 2.0', new policy report says
Special Correspondent (The Hindu Reported this story on 29 Feb 2012)
NonAlignment 2.0 chalks out foreign and strategic policy for India
Warning that the time for India to get its act together is now because of the favourable growth prospects, demographic profile and international environment it faces — all of which may subsequently change — a group of foreign policy experts released a report here on Tuesday, NonAlignment 2.0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the 21st century, which identifies the basic principles and drivers that would make the country a leading player on the world stage while preserving its strategic autonomy and value system.
Unveiled before a packed audience of present and former National Security Advisers, Foreign Secretaries, Ambassadors and High Commissioners and policy wonks, NonAlignment 2.0 was written over 14 months of deliberations by Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan. National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Deputy National Security Advisers Alok Prasad and Latha Reddy also joined some of the deliberations.
As the report reiterated several times, the trends for India to extend its global role and influence are favourable but time is of essence. The basic structures suggested by the report must be quickly implemented because the “underlying factors that are propitious for our growth may not last long.” But the authors say India's big challenge will be to aim at not just being powerful but to set new standards for what the powerful must do, because in international relations, “idealism not backed by power can be self-defeating and power not backed by the power of ideas can be blind.” India's legitimacy in the world will come from its ability to stand for the highest human and universal values and at the global level, “India must remain true to its aspiration of creating a new and alternative universality.”
In a situation where the world is no longer bifurcated between two dominant powers, nonalignment today will require managing complicated coalitions and opportunities in an environment that is not structurally settled, the report say. But former NSA Brajesh Mishra, who spoke at the launch, questioned the approach of the report, especially its view that India not take sides in the rivalry between China and the U.S. China's approach was that of the Middle Kingdom, it wants to be number one, and India's priority should be to build a closer partnership with Washington.
The report deals with India's approach towards the ‘Asian theatre,' the international order, hardpower, internal security, non-conventional security issues like energy and nuclear options, the knowledge and information foundations of power as well as the state and democracy.
NSA Shivshankar Menon commended the overall thrust of the report, especially the link made between the manner in which India dealt with its internal and external challenges. West Bengal Governor and former NSA M.K. Narayanan said the report should have devoted more attention to left wing extremism and questioned some of its conclusions on the internal security front.
The report emphasises that for its strategic and foreign policy to be successful, India must sustain domestic economic growth, social inclusion and democracy. Its approach must be to secure the maximum space possible for its own economic growth in order for the country to become reasonably prosperous and equitable. Although India's competitors will put roadblocks in its path, “the foundations of India's success will depend on its developmental model.”
http://cprindia.org/
Between friends and rivals
A U.S. critique of Nonalignment 2.0 says the report’s fundamental flaw is the gap between its realist reading of world politics and its idealistic solutions
Whether India should lean west, look east, walk
straight, stand at attention in a tough neighbourhood, or be at ease
with a giant, fast-paced China are important questions for policymakers.
Earlier this year a group of Indian analysts made a serious attempt to
provide answers in Nonalignment 2.0, charting a grand strategy while trying to plant firm feet in a shifty and shifting global environment.
The release of Nonalignment 2.0 was
greeted mostly with criticism, some of it eviscerating, some breezy and
some undeserved. The title itself set off fireworks, from Delhi to
Washington, preventing many critics from looking beyond initial outrage
and into the text, so discombobulated they were at the very thought of
reviving a term they had buried with the Cold War. But the same title
gave comfort to others who still believe in the magic realism of
nonalignment.
Perhaps it follows that the report had
no separate chapter or detailed analysis of India-U.S. relations and how
the 2008 civil-nuclear agreement changed the strategic environment for
India. Another country to escape all notice and acknowledgement was
Israel despite the increasingly tight defence relationship.
Nonaligment 2.0 mentions
the United States only in a tertiary and sometimes even in a backhanded
manner, much to the quiet chagrin of India’s supporters in Washington.
This
when for at least the past decade and through two prime ministers, a
string of superlatives upon hyperbole — “the defining partnership of the
21st century,” “natural partners,” “engaged democracies” — has
described the growing relationship. One of the authors, explaining the
missing link to Washingtonians, recently said the U.S. was “a running
thread” in the document, an assumed presence. It didn’t wash.
Analysis
It is no surprise then that the most detailed critique of Nonalignment 2.0 yet
should come from Washington. Ashley Tellis, one of the most respected
strategic thinkers and a key voice on India-U.S. relations, gives Nonalignment 2.0 the
thorough attention it deserves minus the acidity of an ideological
takedown. But a takedown it is, albeit a considered one. Tellis assesses
its prescriptions in almost as much detail as the writers do in laying
out their premise. And then goes about systematically countering each
one of the national security recommendations.
Nonalignment Redux: Perils of Old Wine in New Skins,
to be released early July by the Carnegie Endowment, may raise tempers
but it shouldn't be ignored. Tellis is all praise for the document’s
strong advocacy of economic liberalisation for India and greater
integration with the world. Its declaration that globalisation presents
more opportunities than risks is music to his ears. The enthusiasm for
an open economy is surely a huge leap forward from nonalignment 1.0, and
has enormous implications.
The second track of argument in Nonalignment 2.0 is
strengthening of Indian democracy as a “strategic” task for a nation
burdened by rising aspirations and ineffective delivery systems. Tellis
finds an “honest and penetrating assessment” of India’s democratic
condition but evasion in the answers. While Nonalignment 2.0 endorses
the current government’s effort to create “a rights-based welfare
state” where citizens are provided all basic needs, it does not address
the question of costs. The price tag “could actually end up undermining
the larger economic growth that is critical for India’s success,”
according to Tellis.
The third and perhaps the most important strand in Nonalignment 2.0 is
the discussion of national security into which the previous two streams
flow. And on this Tellis’ hammer comes down hard and repeatedly. For
him the report’s fundamental flaw lies in the gap between its realist
reading of world politics and its idealist solutions. He finds the
report’s embrace of nonalignment as the best organising principle for
India’s relations with the world as “misconceived and downright
dangerous” even when disguised as strategic autonomy.
All
countries want to preserve their physical security and autonomy of
decision-making to the extent possible so India’s quest for “strategic
autonomy” is not unique, he says. The desired end is the same for all.
Tellis contends that the original idea of nonalignment was about the
“means” to get there by staying clear of both blocs. It was a method for
the madness of the Cold War. Nonalignment 2.0, however,
“conflates the ends and means” of nonalignment and resurrects the
concept with “avoidance of sharp choices.” That in short means not
choosing the U.S.
China factor
Ironically,
even though the report regards China as the greatest challenge for India
and agrees there is a meeting of minds with the U.S. on this
perception, it advises against a closer partnership with Washington. “By
so doing, Nonalignment 2.0 fails to appreciate the central
paradox of our times: Strategic autonomy is best achieved through a set
of deep strategic partnerships among friends and allies,” Tellis
concludes. Contrary to the report’s assumptions, India may not have the
luxury of choices the authors envision and even if it does, all partners
are not created equal. India can’t afford “allying with none” given the
differential of power with China and the report’s own analysis.
The
“faulty” conclusions, according to Tellis, may be because the authors
begin with a faulty premise. The key question should be whether India
needs partners to realise its political aims and who best fits that
purpose. Instead, Nonalignment 2.0 frames India’s primary
challenge as its ability to leverage the interests of various rivals
seeking its hand. In that it exaggerates India’s geopolitical importance
and bargaining capacity. Tellis finds this “solipsism” dangerous
because it presumes that the U.S. needs India more than India might in
case of an eventuality vis-à-vis China. He finds it counterproductive
because the smugness prevents genuine cooperation with the US.
India
would be better served by “a sturdy ring” of relationships with
countries near and far because it would create “objective constraint on
China’s misuse of power,” according to Tellis. But Nonalignment 2.0 walks
gingerly around China, saying India should not get into relationships
that go beyond “a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions.” The
worry whether the U.S. would come to India’s rescue in case of a
Sino-Indian conflict is genuine but it would be real only if India
“chooses a priori” not to develop a meaningful partnership with the U.S.
The U.S. then would have no incentive to take on China for India.
But
interestingly, the U.S. is not seeking an alliance against China
despite the persistent commentary to that effect, because “strategic
coordination” and a deep partnership would suffice, Tellis says.
Finally, the question is would India realise its power and potential
when the U.S. is preeminent or another country? Washington is a
cheerleader for a stronger India while China busily strings pearls
around.
Tellis’ assessment is organic food for thought and it should widen the debate.
(Seema Sirohi is a Washington-based journalist.)
